March 16, 2009

New Business for Courts: Pet Custody

Judges may invoke specific performance remedy, appeals panel says
By Mary Pat Gallagher

New Jersey Law Journal

March 10, 2009

When couples break up, judges can decide who gets custody of pets based on their unique sentimental value, a New Jersey appeals court ruled Tuesday, setting a precedent in the state.

The published opinion in Houseman v. Dare, A-2415-07, reverses a trial court's finding that pets differ from personal property like heirlooms, family treasures and works of art and therefore that the equitable remedy of specific performance is not available.

Appellate Division Judges Jane Grall, Stephen Skillman and Ronald Graves found that determination erroneous as a matter of law and remanded for further proceedings.

"There is no reason for a court of equity to be more wary in resolving competing claims for possession of a pet, based on one party's sincere affection for and attachment to it than in resolving competing claims based on one party's sincere sentiment for an inanimate object based on a relationship with the donor," Grall wrote.

The case arose out of the broken engagement of Doreen Houseman and Eric Dane. The couple started dating in 1993, bought a house together in Williamstown in 1999 and became engaged in 2000. In 2003, they paid $1,500 for a pug named Dexter.

Dane broke off the engagement in May 2006 and when Houseman moved out two months later, she took Dexter with her, along with what Grall described as his "paraphernalia." After that, Dexter lived with Houseman, who allowed Dane to take the dog for visits.

In late February 2007, Houseman went on vacation and left Dexter with Dane, but he refused to surrender the dog when she returned on March 4.

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March 11, 2009

Doctrine of Parental Immunity not a protection from ordinary negligence.

Thorpe v. Wiggan, 405 N.J. Super. 68, (2009).

The doctrine of parental immunity has always protected parents from judicial intervention in normal child rearing decisions. The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division recently reexamined this doctrine in Thorpe v. Wiggan. This matter involves the tragic death of a four year-old child, Joseph Wiggan, who burned to death while a passenger in a car driven by his father. This is a negligence acting being brought by the child’s mother against defendant for failing to remove his son from the car before the fire started. The plaintiff appealed the order dismissing her complaint, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
There are two versions of the facts. The first was relayed by defendant to a state police detective via telephone. In this version, he was driving on Route 78 when he noticed that his car was emitting smoke. He then heard “2 bangs,” & he smelled the smoke also, so he pulled over into the shoulder. He got out of the vehicle checked around and so the car was full of smoke. His child was in the back seat, but he was unable to get him out. He wound up in the hospital. He got burned.
The second version of the events, the defendant claims he heard the same “2 bangs,” and he believed a tire blew up. The care then “blew up in flames.” He pulled the car to the shoulder, ran into the bushes and rolled to put the fire out that was on him. Plaintiff conceded that she had no claim against defendant for his second version of the events. Plaintiffs only claim lies under the State Police version.

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