New Jersey Family Law Blog

Parties’ daughter was killed in an automobile accident on October 6, 2007. On January 10, 2008, the plaintiff filed a pro se motion seeking, inter alia, to reduce child support. The plaintiff argued that any modification should be retroactive to the date of the daughters death, while the defendant posited that the filing date of the plaintiff’s motion should go

The applicable law is N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23(a), which basically states that child support can not be made retroactive and will only be permitted from the date of the filing of the motion.

The issue here was whether child support is to be amended on the date of the child’s death or the filing date of the motion. There have been several scenarios where the courts have granted retroactive modification to child support. In the case of Keegan v. Keegan, 326, N.J. Super. 289, 741 A.2d 134 (App. Div. 1999), trial court granted a retroactive increase in the aspect of child support. Halliwell v. Halliwell, 326 N.J. Super. 442, 741 A.2d 638 (App. Div. 1999), dealt with the issue of retroactive modification of an obligor who was incarcerated for an extended period of time

The most analogous case to the one at bar was Mahoney v. Pennell, 285 N.J. Super. 638, 667 A.2d 1119 (App. Div. 1995), dealt with whether retroactive modification was permissible in the event of an emancipated child. The court said, “we cannot ascribe to this legislation, nor do we find any indication that the legislature so intended, to bar termination of child support retroactively to the time a child became emancipated.” Id. at 643.

The court in this case said that upon the death of the parties’ daughter, the duty to pay support for her ceased. To bar retroactive modification would be to punish financially an obligor who has thoughtfully, and in good faith, allowed an appropriate period of grieving and healing to take place before seeking redress in court.

Accordingly, this court found that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23(a) does not bar the modification of child support retroactive to the date of death of any of the parties’ children.

Court Enunciates New Test for Tolling Child Sex Abuse Statute of Limitations
By Michael Booth
New Jersey Law Journal
June 11, 2009

The state Supreme Court on Thursday set out a two-stage analysis that trial judges must conduct to decide whether and for how long the two-year statute of limitations in child sexual abuse suits can be tolled.

The formula, which includes objective and subjective elements, will determine whether a Morris County man can pursue a suit, filed in 2004, alleging that his stepfather sexually assaulted him multiple times from 1987 and 1990, when he was between ages 10 to 12.

Superior Judge David Rand dismissed the suit as time-barred, but the Appellate Division reversed, saying the plaintiff did not appreciate that the abuse caused his emotional injuries until undergoing psychotherapy in 2002 and thus that the complaint was filed within two years of accrual of the cause of action.

In Thursday's ruling, R L. v. Voytac, A-61-08, Justice John Wallace Jr. said both lower courts erred. Rand did not conduct a thorough enough inquiry into when the plaintiff should have known that the root of his problems lay with the alleged sexual abuse, which the stepfather, Kenneth Voytac, denies.

And the Appellate Division mistakenly conflated two provisions in the Child Sexual Abuse Act. An action for child sex abuse must be filed within two years after "the reasonable discovery of the injury and its casual relationship to the act of sexual abuse" but the limitations period may be tolled because of the plaintiff's "mental state, duress by the defendant, or any other equitable grounds," the act says.

"We conclude that pursuant to the Act, the trial court must first determine when a reasonable person subjected to childhood abuse would discover that the defendant's conduct caused him or her injury. That is an objective test," wrote Wallace. "If that period is more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the court must next determine whether the statute should be tolled because of 'the mental state, duress by the defendant, or any other equitable grounds.'"

The justices remanded the case for that analysis and said that since Rand made several factual and credibility findings, another judge should handle it.

Voytac's lawyer, William Johnson, says he and is client are pleased with the ruling. "The Court correctly interpreted the act as saying there is an objective standard to be applied when determining when the cause of action accrued," says Johnson, of Dover's Johnson & Johnson. "The Appellate Division had applied a subjective standard."

R.L.'s lawyer, Victor Rotolo, who runs his own firm in Lebanon, says he relishes retrying the case. "I have to go back to the beginning, but that's fine," he says. "The ruling gives plaintiffs a clear roadmap as to what they have to do."

New York Times
By: Julie Bosman

The same story echoed a dozen times through Room E8 of Manhattan Family Court in a single day: fathers, pinched by the recession, pleading for a reduction in child support.

A salesman at Saks Fifth Avenue who is estranged from his teenage daughter said he feared he would be included in the next round of layoffs expected at his store.

A man who had been laid off from a factory said he managed to find work at Mets games, but for less pay, $9 an hour. Another man, on the verge of eviction, begged for a break from his $315 monthly payments.

“Last week was my child’s birthday, and I couldn’t get him a present,” he said, burying his head in his hands. “This is killing me.”

Since January, Family Court in New York has been filled with urgent requests like these, alarming judges and overwhelming calendars with what are known as modification cases.

Continue reading "Fighting over Child Support After the Pink Slip Arrives" »